Why not a DAO?
A DAO can concentrate what this system is built to distribute. Token-weighted ownership tends to reproduce, in faster code, the wealth-over-reputation logic Favour Bucks was designed to escape.
01
Plutocracy in faster code
Most production DAOs default to token-weighted power, either formally or socially. Whoever holds the most can steer the system. Rule 02 above is reputation over wealth — token-weighted control inverts that on day one.
02
Smart contracts can't judge favours
"Did Lucia deliver the milk in good condition?" is contextual, social, and human. The dispute ladder needs witnesses, Groups, and arbitration. Code-as-law cannot answer this question.
03
Tokens compound. Favours shouldn't.
A governance token tends to become hoardable, tradable, and expectation-bearing. That is the failure mode the no-compound-interest rule was written against.
04
The charity shell does work a DAO cannot
Tax-deductible escrow. Fiduciary defense in court. Mission lock against capture. Regulatory legibility for a Canadian launch. A generic DAO wrapper does not answer that public-benefit posture by itself.
05
The label imports the wrong frame
In 2026, "DAO" signals token speculation, anonymous founders, exit-scam risk, and rug pulls. The brochure is a long argument against the extraction model that ecosystem is largely built on.
What we keep from the decentralized tradition: soulbound receipts, open protocol, federated Groups, public reporting, member-portable reputation. What we don't: token-weighted voting, smart-contract-only governance, ownership as power.